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COMMENTARY
THE CREATIVE COMMONS*
Lawrence Lessig**
In 1928, a hero of mine, Walt Disney, created Steamboat
Willie. It is from Steamboat Willie that we got Mickey Mouse,
and from Mickey Mouse that we got the Disney Corporation. So
much you are likely to have known. But what you might not
have known is that in 1928, another man, Buster Keaton, also
produced a work of similar comic genius. That work was called
Steamboat Bill, Jr. And it was from Steamboat Bill, Jr. that
Walt Disney was inspired to create Steamboat Willie. Indeed, so
explicitly was Steamboat Bill, Jr. part of the creation of Steam-
boat Willie that in the storyboard for the cartoon Steamboat Wil-
lie, the direction explicitly states that the music to be used in
the creation of the character was the music from Steamboat Bill.
So from Steamboat Bill, we got Steamboat Willie, and from
Steamboat Willie, we got Mickey Mouse, and from Mickey
Mouse, the Disney Corporation. This is a kind of creativity. You
could call it Disney creativity, but we should be more precise.
This is "Walt Disney creativity," and it was shot through Walt
Disney's creative work. He was always parroting the feature
* This is an edited transcript of the Judge James R. Browning Distinguished
Lecture in Law, delivered at the University of Montana School of Law on April 11, 2003.
It is based on a book, Free Culture (Penguin Press 2003).
** John A. Wilson Distinguished Scholar and Professor of Law, Stanford University.
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length mainstream films. His career was filled with examples of
taking works that were in the public domain, and parroting,
changing, improving them to produce something new.
There are other, more famous examples. The Brothers
Grimm produced fairytales. They were, in a word, grim: bloody,
moralistic stories that were brushed-up for us by the creativity
of Walt Disney. We now think of them as nice stories, stories
you should let your children read. But only a very ambitious
parent would expose their children to the original Grimm fairy-
tales. We think of them as nice today because they have been
retold to us through this instance of Disney creativity. He
changed that work that was before. He changed it by embracing
it and embracing a freedom that the law gave him to take, to
change and to release other people's work.
This ideal of Disney creativity is of course not limited to
Disney. Nor is it limited to the United States. Indeed, it's a fa-
mous part of Japanese culture right now. The Japanese are ob-
sessed with a kind of comic that they call "Manga". Manga in
Japan constitutes forty percent of all publications in the Japa-
nese market, thirty percent of revenues to publishers.
In addition to Manga, there's another strain of comics called
"Dojinshi". These are what we would call copycat comics. A
whole industry of creators takes existing comics and modifies
them in slight or dramatic way, and releases that modified ver-
sion as a Dojinshi comic. There are 33,000 circles of these crea-
tors in Japan right now, and twice a year the largest public
gathering of people in Japan is a conference to trade and sell
these Dojinshi comics. This engine of creative work has been
described as the source of the extraordinary creativity that ex-
ists in the context of comics in Japan today. That creativity
feeds the mainstream creation of Manga comics.
The ideal of this form of creativity-both Walt Disney crea-
tivity and the creativity that exists in Japan-still lives, even in
America. It has been exploded recently by the introduction of a
technology that enables a wide range of people to participate in
exactly this form of creativity. This is digital technology, which
is creating digital tools that people can use to express and recre-
ate the culture around them.
This technology has created the digital consumer. Digital
consumers are different from analog consumers. The analog
consumer was the couch potato-passive, programmed, broad-
cast to. The digital consumer is active, rather than passive. She
programs, rather than is programmed. And in peer-to-peer
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manner, she spreads her creativity to the many, rather than re-
ceiving it broadcast from the few.
Here's an example that Apple is proud of: Brad Schaeffer, a
14-year-old, took Apple's iMovie technology, and produced a film
that HBO purchased and put on HBO. Or here's another exam-
ple that captures a bit more clearly the potential for political
speech using this type of technology: a digitally remixed video of
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair singing "Endless Love"
in perfect lip-synchronization.
The majority of the best of these products are by amateurs,
not professionals: amateurs taking digital technology and find-
ing a way to change the content to express their message. This
technology enables active programming, feeding creators and
building culture in a way that's different from the culture-
building that we all grew up with. It's a technology that enables
sampling, changing, releasing culture in exactly the way Walt
Disney did. But this is Walt Disney creativity squared, for this
is an imagination and a set of tools that reaches beyond large
corporations into the hands of ordinary people.
This technology has inspired a market that builds on this
freedom to create. Apple sells the idea of the "Rip. Mix. Burn."
Culture-the idea that you should be free to take or rip; you
should be free to change or mix; you should be free to release or
burn, all producing a culture that expresses ideas differently. It
is exactly the freedom that Disney knew. But now technology
explodes the possibility for creativity-unless the law gets in the
way.
So here's the puzzle. Let's go back to comics. Manga in Ja-
pan is a flourishing market. United States Manga is essentially
dead. We've got men in tights. We even have women in tights.
But it's the same sort of thing that it's always been. It's not
growing. It's essentially dead. Why is this?
From a Disney perspective, the reason is obvious. The rea-
son is that the law now regulates Disney creativity. For exam-
ple, in 1995, Alvin Cat and Chris Wren released a rip, mix and
burn of the Cat in the Hat-titled "The Cat Not in the Hat." It
was a takeoff on the O.J. Simpson trial. They released that car-
toon and quickly found themselves in federal court sued by the
owners of Dr. Seuss's copyrights for a claim that the effort to rip,
mix, and burn culture was no longer permitted.
Or much more famously, in 1971 Bobby London and Danny
O'Neill produced a cartoon called Air Pirates. It was a critical
view of Mickey Mouse. But they found quite quickly that the
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courts would intervene to tell them that they were not free to
rip, mix, and burn Mickey Mouse.
So one might wonder: How is it that if Mickey Mouse is
permitted, Air Pirates is not? It is because the law governing
creativity has changed, transformed dramatically in the past
forty years in a way that removes the opportunity for the kind of
creativity that was our tradition just at the time when the tech-
nology would turn it into something extraordinary.
We are in the middle of a war. A copyright war. A war that
Jack Valenti calls a "terrorist war," where the terrorists are our
own children. A war that lobbyists have won by convincing the
world that this constant value of copyright is now under threat.
This war is to defend this constant value-as Jack Valenti
preaches, this traditional value-of copyright.
But here's what we miss. Copyright is not the Rock of Gi-
braltar. It has not remained fixed over the ages. Instead, copy-
right is constantly changing. It was a tiny little bit of regulation
of the creative process; it has since expanded dramatically. And
so before we allow the law to intervene to render this digital
consumer illegal, we should ask-does the mix of protection that
copyright law gives make sense? Does it make sense still?
Let's begin by understanding the changes that copyright
law has undergone. There are five dimensions. First, duration:
Disney builds its empire on top of the public domain because the
culture in the public domain was free to take. It was free to take
because copyrights expire, and when they expire, the work
passes into a public domain. What is the public domain? The
public domain is a lawyer-free zone. It is a place where culture
lives permission-free. One needs no authority from anybody to
take and build upon culture that lives in the public domain. It is
guaranteed by the freedom of the public domain forever. Copy-
rights expire because the Constitution says they are to be lim-
ited.
In the Anglo-American tradition, before at least 1774, they
were not limited. Copyrights before 1774 were perpetual. But
after a decision in 1774 interpreting the Statute of Anne (of
1710) established that the term of copyright was set by statute,
limited terms became the norm.
The United States copied English law. In 1789, we adopted
in our Constitution a clause that says that "Congress has the
power to promote the progress of science ... by securing for lim-
ited times exclusive rights to authors.., for their writings .... "
In 1790, the framers of that Constitution created a copy-
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right term that was fourteen years and could be renewed once if
the author lived to the end of the first term. Five percent of
work that could have been copyrighted was actually copyrighted
during the first ten years of that regime, and the vast majority
of that copyrighted work was never renewed. Thus, ninety-five
percent of creative work passed into the public domain immedi-
ately.
This term of protection has changed. In 1831 it was ex-
tended to forty-two years. In 1909, to fifty-six years. And then,
beginning in 1962, the copyright term has been increased for
works that already exist quite regularly. Eleven times in the
last forty years Congress has extended the copyright term for ex-
isting works. The latest of these extensions was the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the terms of ex-
isting copyrights by twenty years. In practice (regardless of the-
ory), we have established a system of perpetual copyright, even
if only granted, as Peter Jaszi has described it, on the install-
ment plan.
This is the system that has replaced the idea that copy-
rights would expire and that works would pass into the public
domain. And the effect of this change has been especially dra-
matic in the last thirty years. In 1973 the average term of copy-
rights was just 32.2 years. Because copyrights had to be re-
newed after twenty-eight years, and eighty-five percent of
copyrighted works were never renewed, the average term was
quite short. But after changes in the 1976 Act, and especially
after the most recent extensions, the average term is now the
maximum. For corporate works, that means a term of ninety-
five years. The average term for corporate works has thus tri-
pled in the last thirty years.
Second, copyright's scope: In 1790, copyright reached maps,
charts and books. Its protection extended to someone's effort to
republish maps, charts and books. It restricted the publication
of the same work, not a derivative work, and it gave that protec-
tion only if you registered the work, only if you deposited copies
of the work in a library, and only if you marked the work with a
symbol to put the world on notice. The law was essentially a
regulation of publishers. In 1790, there were 174 publishers in
the United States. It was a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the
American economy.
This, too, has changed dramatically. The law no longer
regulates just maps, charts and books; it governs anything basi-
cally reduced to a tangible form. It regulates not just against
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someone who wants to republish the same work; it regulates
anyone who would "copy" the work. It regulates not just the
same work, but derivative works too. It regulates whether or
not the work is registered, whether or not the work is deposited,
whether or not it is marked with the famous copyright mark--.
Automatically, copyright law regulates essentially any creative
work reduced to a tangible form.
Third is a change in reach: Copyright law regulates copies.
So let's think about all the possible uses of a copyrighted work.
Take a book. Many of these uses of a book in real space are to-
tally unregulated. You can read a book without the copyright
law regulating you because there's no copy made when you read
a book. You can give it to someone without the copyright law
regulating you because there's no copy made when you give a
book to someone. You can sell it without the law regulating you,
you can sleep on it without the law regulating you. You can do
all of these things without the regulation of the law.
At the core of all these possible uses is a set of uses that the
law traditionally granted copyright owners control over. So, for
example, if you want to publish a copyrighted work, that's a
regulated use of the work. And then, in addition to the unregu-
lated and regulated uses of the work, there's a tiny sliver of pre-
sumptively regulated uses which the law privileges whether or
not the copyright owner agrees. These uses are fair uses. So
you're allowed to quote my book in a review of my book, even if
it's critical, regardless of what I say. You have that right pro-
tected by the law.
Enter the Internet, with a fundamental architectural fea-
ture: Every act on the Internet is a copy. Every act in a digital
network produces a copy. And that simple architectural fact
means that the scope of copyright regulation has changed dra-
matically.
Here's an instance of what I'm thinking of here. I have an
E-book reader provided to me by Adobe Corporation. That
reader gives publishers the power to control how people use the
texts contained within the reader. So for example, I have some
books inside the Adobe E-book reader. Here's one, Middle-
march, a book that is in the public domain. If you click on the
"permissions" for Middlemarch, you are told that you're given
the permission to copy ten text selections to the clipboard every
ten days. You can print ten pages of this book every ten days,
and you're allowed to use the "read aloud" button to listen to this
book. Here's another book, Aristotle's Politics. The permissions
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here state: You may not copy any text selections to the clipboard
of this book. You may not print any pages of this book, but, fear
not, you're allowed to use the "read aloud" button to listen to
this book on your computer. And, to my great embarrassment,
here's my most recent book, The Future of Ideas: Don't copy any
text from my book, don't print any pages in the book, and don't
you dare try to listen to my book on your computer!
These controls get built into the technology for gaining ac-
cess to copyrighted works and uncopyrighted works. And be-
cause every act in a digital network is a copy, this means that a
presumptive unregulated space of ordinary uses becomes pre-
sumptively regulated. Uses that before were not within the
scope of copyright law now come within copyright's scope-an
expansion of the reach of copyright never intended by anyone.
Fourth is a change in the force of its regulation: Before the
net, the law regulated through the courts. Courts, which meant
that eventually a judge would have to say whether the regula-
tion of the law was reasonable, which meant that eventually a
human would have to say whether the regulation of the law was
reasonable.
So consider the famous story of the Warner Brothers and
Marx Brothers getting into a battle over Casablanca because the
Marx Brothers intended to produce a parody of Casablanca. The
Warner Brothers got wind of this and sent a very nasty letter to
the Marx Brothers saying they had no permission to make a
parody of the work Casablanca. This led the Marx Brothers to
send a letter to the Warner Brothers saying, well, you should
recognize that the Marx Brothers have been around longer than
Warner Brothers and, therefore, Marx Brothers owns the word
"brothers" and that Warner Brothers had better watch out.
The point is that these extremisms would never have
harmed the law, because in the end, a judge would need to listen
to these arguments and find them persuasive. In that process,
absurdity fades. But increasingly, it is no longer courts that are
enforcing copyright law. Increasingly, it is technology. Increas-
ingly, it is the software, or technology, or generically, "code" that
controls how you get access to the copyrighted works that de-
termine what your freedom is. Increasingly, that means your
freedom is restricted by code.
And not just code. As if code was not powerful enough,
Congress is now passing laws that purport to protect the code
that protects copyrighted (and noncopyrighted) material. These
protections often extend beyond the protections of copyright law
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itself.
Here's my favorite example. There's a little creature called
a Sony Aibo dog. The Aibo dog is like a regular dog, though a ro-
bot-expensive, but not quite as messy. It moves around, and
you can teach it to do things. Many people purchased the Sony
Aibo and loved it. One fan loved it so much that he set up a Web
site called aibopet.com. On aibopet.com, he described all sorts of
things you can do with a Sony Aibo dog, including how to "hack"
the dog. Not with a machete, but in the computer sense of hack-
ing, meaning a way to teach the dog to do new tricks. In par-
ticular, he wanted to teach the dog to dance jazz.
People outside of the United States are sometimes confused
about this, so I want to make sure we all understand: it's not a
crime to dance jazz in the United States. Outside of Georgia,
and indeed, in most jurisdictions, it's a completely legal activity
to dance jazz, even to teach your dog to dance jazz. So the activ-
ity that this Web site was instructing people on how to do was a
totally permissible activity.
And yet, when he posted this instruction for how to hack the
Sony Aibo pet, he got this letter from Sony: 'Your site contains
information providing the means to circumvent Aibo's copy pro-
tection protocol, constituting a violation of the anticircumven-
tion provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act." The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act is a law that says you can't
muck about with any code designed to protect copyrighted mate-
rial, even if the use you would make of that copyrighted material
is totally legal under the law. The code thus protects copy-
righted material more strongly than the law, and the law makes
it a crime to circumvent the code to reestablish the balance that
the law originally was intended to protect.
And fifth, and finally, is a change in the concentration of
media: Copyright law, as we tend to forget, was originally struc-
tured the way it was in order to limit the scope of media monop-
oly. In 1710, the motivation in passing the statute in England
was to break publishing monopolies. Publishers were hated in
England. As Milton described them, they were "Old patentees
and monopolizers in the trade of bookselling, men who do not la-
bor in an honest profession to which learning is indebted." The
view was that these publishers-monopolists-had too much
power over English culture. They owned copyrights forever.
They picked which works would get republished, and when those
works were published was totally within their control. And thus
the English adopted limited times as a way to allow works to
Vol. 65
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pass into the public domain and allow other publishers to
emerge who could compete with those monopolists.
In America, we added one additional innovation here. We
granted copyrights to authors, not to booksellers, which meant
the author ultimately controlled who got the right to publish his
or her book, which meant the author could help weaken concen-
trations in power. That meant we produced lots of little mo-
nopolies, but because there are lots of little monopolies out
there, which is what a copyright is, it doesn't create any great
distortion on the process for creating culture.
This, too, has dramatically changed, and in just the last
twenty years. Concentration of media in the United States is
dramatically different from what it was even twenty years ago.
Today, eighty percent of the music distributed in the world is
distributed by five companies. Seventy percent of the radio
market is controlled by just four firms. Eighty percent of televi-
sion and cable in the United States is controlled by six firms. In
1947, eighty percent of newspapers were independent. Today
that number is below twenty percent. In 1970, ten percent of
major first-run films in America were foreign films. That num-
ber is now .5 percent. This concentration in these monopolies
has produced a world where no longer are there many people
competing to produce and distribute culture. Instead, there is
increasingly just a handful. Well, a kind of alien handful-it is
six, not five, companies exercising all this control. This is a con-
centrated form of control producing a kind of homogeneous cul-
ture, a culture which is increasingly tailored to this vision of a
certain mainstream market and, therefore, protects that market
against different kinds of creativity.
If you add all of these changes together-the changes in du-
ration, scope, reach, force, and concentration-then you reach a
point that is important for us to see: Never in our history have
fewer exercised more control over the development of our culture
than now. Not when copyrights were perpetual, because even
then the reach of the right was only narrowly about republishing
a particular work. Never has the concentration been as signifi-
cant as it is now. And so, just at the time when the technology
enables an extraordinary range of new creativity, the new crea-
tors, the new Walt Disneys, must fight this system of legal regu-
lation to find a right to speak. But the law regulates that right
in a way it didn't before. Today, no one can do to the Disney
Corporation what Walt Disney did to the Brothers Grim. The
free society that defines our tradition is increasingly a permis-
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sion society. The free culture that defined our birth is increas-
ingly an owned culture-where the ability to cultivate that cul-
ture is a function of the permission you can get from the culture
owners.
This war, this culture war, is a product of an insane and un-
intended consequence of the law. Eighteenth century law has
now been bloated by two-hundred years of change, shrinking the
traditional freedoms which defined the rights of people to create.
The freedom to speak using the culture around you, the freedom
to cultivate the culture around you, the freedom to criticize us-
ing the culture around you, the freedom to Disnify the culture
around you: those freedoms are increasingly restricted. And the
question becomes, how do we respond?
Here's one response. We live in a world governed by ex-
tremes. Two views about copyright dominate. There are those
that believe that all rights must be controlled, and those who be-
lieve that no rights should be controlled. Call them the alls and
the nones.
But the world is divided not into two, but into three. There
are those who believe in all rights reserved, those who believe in
no rights at all, but there are also many who believe that some
rights should be controlled but not all.
In the beginning of the Internet, the architecture of the
Internet disabled any ability to control the distribution of copy-
righted works. That meant that if we had this triad among all,
some, and none, the effective protection of the original Internet
was none. The architecture meant that copyright was not re-
spected because anybody could copy and perfectly distribute any
copyrighted work without control.
That extreme begot another: the terror of the copyright in-
dustry, which in 1995, in response to the Internet launched a
campaign to change the technical and legal infrastructure that
defined the Internet, to change the Internet from an architec-
ture of no control into an architecture of total control. So again,
instead of a triad, we have increasingly an architecture of total
control over everything. We have thus moved from one extreme
to the other: from the extreme of total freedom to total control,
and this is the shift the law is encouraging.
I'm not against extremists. Some of my best friends are ex-
tremists. Let them be extremists. The point is that we're solv-
ing based on the extremes. We're setting up a regime that
thinks as if the world is either one or the other when it is in fact
neither. Some want total control, some want no control, but
Vol. 65
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most want this balance in the middle. Not "all rights reserved,"
not "no rights reserved," but increasingly the idea of "some
rights reserved." My content is out there, I want you to respect
it in some ways, but I want you to use it in lots of ways that tra-
ditional "all rights reserved" models would not permit.
Enter an organization that I have helped start called the
Creative Commons. Think of it as pushing, as another founder,
James Boyle, describes it, as a kind of environmentalism for cul-
ture. The idea here is that we need to build a layer of reason-
able copyright law, by showing the world a layer of reasonable
copyright law resting on top of the extremes. Take this world
that is increasingly a world by default regulating all and change
it into a world where once again we can see the mix between all,
none, and some, using the technology of the Creative Commons.
This change is done through the voluntary action of indi-
viduals--creators, content owners. They take voluntary action
by marking their content with a tag that expresses a kind of
freedom. They use these tags then to build a kind of balance
into the system to restore this reasonableness into the system by
giving people a way to say, "I don't believe in this extremism."
For example, if you go to the Creative Commons Web site
(http://creativecommons.org), you are given a very simple choice
by which you can select the freedoms you want to grant. You
can say, "I want people to give me attribution or not," or you can
say, "I want people to use this for commercial use or not," or you
can say, "I want to allow people to modify this or not," or you can
use what we call a "share alike" license that says, whatever
freedoms you got from me, you have to pass on to someone else.
Once you make these selections, the technology then produces a
license that is comprised of three separate layers. One layer is a
human-readable version of that license. Another is the lawyer-
readable version of the license-the license. And a third layer is
a machine-readable version of the license, which enables com-
puters to understand what freedoms you are granting.
These three layers live together in a "Creative Commons"
tag. And in four months, more than 400,000 pages have ap-
peared on the Internet linking back to these licenses. Four-
hundred thousand have said, we believe in a kind of freedom as-
sociated with our content that is not the extreme.
Now we want this 400,000 to turn into 10,000,000. Because
if there are 10,000,000 people out there who say we don't believe
in the extremes, then this debate is no longer a debate between
copyright owners and anarchists. Instead, it is increasingly a
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debate between extremists and those who believe in a tradition
that expresses a freedom more fundamental. Beyond the per-
missions of fair use, these licenses give people ways to say go
ahead, sample me, share me, copy me, liberate me, and together
they restore something of balance in this debate. And this bal-
ance, we believe, will enable a different kind of creativity: crea-
tivity built upon a tradition of building upon the works of others,
freely. A free culture, not the permission culture that our law
has produced.
I have been in the middle of this debate now for about five
years. It has only gotten worse. And its character was perfectly
captured for me in a moment of terror I experienced on a recent
flight to Oakland airport. I can't remember the numbers pre-
cisely, but imagine our flight was United flight 235. We were
landing in very bad weather, and, while listening to air traffic I
heard our pilot say, "This is United flight 235 with you at 10,000
feet." Silence. Then the air traffic controller came back and
said, "United flight 253 turn left." More silence. The air traffic
controller again said, "United flight 253 turn left immediately."
More silence still. And the air traffic controller then said, or al-
most screamed, "Silence on the channel: United flight 253, ac-
knowledge, and turn left immediately."
At some point in this exchange, another pilot came on and
said, "Are you trying to call United flight 235?" And the tower
said, '"Yes, United 235." And he said, "Well, you didn't call 235,
you called 253." Instantly our plane steered to the left. And
then the tower said, "I've been calling you forever, where have
you been?" And then an argument broke out: 'You've been call-
ing United 253." The controller contradicted him. Another pilot
confirmed the claim of the first. The controller contradicted
both. And in the middle of all this, I thought: "This is extraordi-
nary. It is 2003, and air traffic is controlled by a system where
the tower and the airplane do not know that they're talking to
each other just because the controller made a simple mistake.
Air traffic lives with a technology where this profound collision
could almost have happened merely because we hadn't learned
how to talk to each other."
This is, in a fundamental sense, the battle going on in the
context of culture today. There is an extraordinary potential
enabled by a technology that is increasingly threatened and de-
stroyed. The potential for a different, critical, democratic crea-
tivity, is increasingly being forced into last century's model for
doing business.
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It is a world where the dinosaurs have been given the power
to control evolution. A system where last century's powerful has
the ability to veto next century's innovators. In such a world,
creativity and innovation die. The free culture that defined our
tradition has been eroded, not by idealists, but by lobbyists. The
free culture that we have lived under now is under threat. And
we have an obligation, all of us, to engage in this practice to en-
able this freedom again.
In the last five years, we have spent a long time in courts.
And lots of time before legislatures. These efforts have failed.
They have failed because the debate has become so polarized
and so binary that the choice seems a choice just between prop-
erty and anarchy. And in that world, there is no choice for us
except property.
We are lawyers, most of us. We speak from a certain tradi-
tion and that tradition has been a tradition of balance. Yet the
Bar has allowed this debate to become so polarized because our
lawyers are too little for this tradition, and too much for a par-
ticular set of clients.
I believe in clients. I believe in loyalty to clients. But I also
believe in a loyalty to our profession. We as a profession have a
duty to fight extremism. We have an obligation to carry on a
tradition that preserves the free culture that was the culture
that our framers gave us. We have the obligation to at least al-
low our culture to know the truth of our tradition and choose, in
the light of that truth, between the extremism that defines the
debate right now and a practice that would enable this genera-
tion's Disneys to flourish as famously as the last. Using tech-
nologies increasingly available to everyone, and a platform for
spreading ideas never imagined by anyone.
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